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FROM WAR TO PEACE: WHEN DEMOCRACY PREVAILS? 
IZABELA PEREIRA WATTS* 
ABSTRACT 
Why are some war-torn countries able to make the transition to democracy? 
This paper intends to bring to light central dilemmas originating from the 
efforts of building peace and democracy in fragile states after war. We will 
focus on understanding the tensions and contradictions in post-conflict 
democratization, the challenges facing interim governments and the role of the 
international community. We will first analyze the set of structural and 
common dilemmas of peace-building and democratization in the aftermath of 
civil war, such as temporal, systemic, horizontal, and vertical dilemmas. The 
paper highly contributes theoretically to the body of knowledge by proposing a 
spiral of interrelated additional 8 dilemmas: security, safety, moral, 
sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. Secondly, the 
different dilemmas will be addressed in relation to elections. Thirdly, 
constitutionalism is a sine qua non mechanism for establishing the new “social 
contract” based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the 
processes of democratization and peace-building are promoted by international 
actors who also face their own range of varying and even mutually 
contradictory dilemmas. In conclusion, from war to peace, democracy might 
prevail initially with a minimalist approach. But only if certain choices of 
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elections procedures and constitutionalism design with specific separation of 
power and power sharing arrangements are foreseen towards sustainable peace. 
The paper has a multi-layered perspective that tries to fill the gaps between 
theory and practice on fragile states, civil wars, democratic governance and 
state institution building. By advancing theory and practice with policy-
relevant results, the research hopes to facilitate more effective interventions 
and sustainable transitions from war to peace through democratic means. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
PEACE-BUILDING 
On the transition from war to peace: when can democracy be a tool for 
sustainable Peace? Why are some war-torn countries able to make the 
transition to democracy? In post-conflict situations, how can the international 
community assist the birth or consolidation of liberal and democratic states? In 
a globalized world, the popular terminology of “fight for democracy” can also 
be lethal, violent, and a tool to legitimize the abuse of power. The peace 
crusade from war to democracy is an uncertain path. “Peace” and 
“Democracy” are two often-desired goals promoted in societies devastated by 
war. Constructing democracy and building peace have come to be viewed as 
inherently inseparable: “democratic peace building” sums up this compound 
agenda and is a key element of international assistance. Curiously, the 
historical facts show a paradox. With the “the third wave” of democratization, 
the number of democracies in the world more than doubled and democracy 
came to be seen as the only legitimate form of government. However, the 
number and complexity of armed conflicts or crises has also increased. 
Consequently, the number of UN peace operations currently in existence is 
unprecedented.1 Furthermore, interventions involving the maintenance of 
peace, which is the UN’s main mandate, require multidimensional approaches 
to also deal with complex threats as regional spill over, internationalized civil 
wars and terrorism. Conversely, the design of complex operations is often 
mismatched with existing institutional operational capabilities as well with the 
principles of international law. 
When the civil war ends, democracy is yet to begin. As the mantra goes, it 
is a never-ending process that usually experiences progress and regression. 
There are not yet any pillars of an ideal western form of democracy with solid 
institutions or mechanisms of constitutionalism, power-sharing, checks and 
balances, rule of law, human rights, accountability, public policy formulation 
and implementation, free and capable media or independent and non-
discriminatory judiciary nor decentralized political system with multiparty 
political landscapes. On the contrary, civil wars leave a legacy of absence of 
political culture of tolerance, failed or even collapsed state institutions, weak or 
non-existent civil societies, and profound distrust among political actors. It is 
peculiarly challenging for countries that have experienced civil war to make 
the transition to democracy. 
In the aftermath of conflict, the State is on standby: in limbo struggling for 
security within a hectic labyrinth of divergent interests and multiple actors. 
Establishing democracy in the aftermath of a civil war has proved to be a 
 
 1. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/peace 
keeping/documents/bnote0116.pdf. 
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challenging proposition, but not an impossible one. “Democratization should 
not be presumed to be a panacea,” says Sebastian von Einsiedel.2 Recently, the 
interventions occur more frequently within internal conflict scenarios, 
including civil wars (intrastate) or conflicts with regional spill over.3 Some 
studies suggest that “more than two-thirds of all armed conflicts in the world 
since 1945 have taken the form of civil wars,”4 and that fragile states are 
“fifteen times more prone to civil war than developed countries, and they are 
the source of most of the world’s refugees.”5 According to United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), at the end of 
2015, 125 million people from 37 fragile states have been displaced by 
conflict.6 Several political theorists have denied that there is the possibility of 
popular government arising immediately out of the chaos of civil war. From 
Machiavelli to Huntington, the transition very often leads first to a one-man 
rule such as a Prince, Leviathan, or a military dictator before the actual 
democratic regime takes place. According to Hartzell and Hoddie, “thirty-five 
of the sixty-three countries that experienced civil war from 1945 through the 
end of 2006 made the transition to a minimalist, Schumpeterian form of 
democracy during the first decade following the end of their respective armed 
conflicts.”7 Leonard Wantchekon finds that nearly 40% of all civil wars that 
took place from 1945 to 1993 resulted in an improvement in the level of 
democracy.8 For example, civil wars gave birth to relatively stable 
democracies in Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua among 
 
 2. Sebastian von Einsiedel, Policy Responses to State Failure, in MAKING STATES WORK: 
STATE FAILURE AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 13, 27 (Simon Chesterman et al. eds., 2005). 
 3. LOTHAR BROCK ET AL., FRAGILE STATES: VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF 
INTERVENTION 1 (2012); See Michael E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and 
Implications, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT 209, 209–14 (Chester Crocker et al. eds 2001); VIRGINIA P. FORTNA, DOES 
PEACEKEEPING WORK: SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICES AFTER CIVIL WAR 1 (2008); See 
U.N. Development Programme Guidance Note, Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery 
3 (2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/ilrc/Governance%20in%20Conflict%20Prevention% 
20&%20Recovery%20Guidance%20Note.pdf. 
 4. Duk H. Kim, Nurturing Peace: United Nations Peace-building Operations in the 
Aftermath of Intrastate Conflicts, 1945-2002 1 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Missouri – St. Louis) (on file with ProQuest Information and Learning Company). 
 5. SETH D. KAPLAN, FIXING FRAGILE STATES: A NEW PARADIGM FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 
(Praeger Sec. Int’l 2008); Stewart Patrick, Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?, 29 
THE WASH. Q., Spring 2006, at 27, 31. 
 6. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian 
Overview 2016 (2016), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GHO-2016.pdf. 
 7. Caroline A. Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and 
Post-Civil War Democracy, 67 WORLD POL. 37, 37 (Jan. 2015). 
 8. Leonard Wantchekon, The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical 
Investigation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 17 (Feb. 2004). 
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others.9 Curiously, civil wars that end in a military victory, in particular those 
that end in a rebel victory are associated with higher levels of democracy in the 
longer perspective than are wars that end in a cease-fire or peace agreement.10 
After the Cold War, and particularly from the 90’s, democratization has 
been formally enshrined in the post-war settlement of nearly all intrastate wars. 
The use of democratic processes and the creation or transformation of 
institutions have been promoted as a transitional recipe to evolve from armed 
conflict towards peaceful political competition.11 Towards an “elusive peace,” 
a “turbulent democracy” seems to be an inevitable way.12 The inherent risk of 
partial democratization is the danger of hostilities amplifying and channeling 
back to an endless cycle of conflict, in lieu of converting towards the cycle of 
peace.13 Extensive empirical studies suggest that mature democracies are 
indeed the most stable and peaceful of all regimes.14 Conversely, the process of 
“how to get there” from transitional, unstable, or failed democracies remains 
not so much picture-perfect. On a large conceptual gray zone, most war-torn 
societies discover themselves sandwiched by war-and-peace or by war-and-
democracy.15 Therefore, as it remains an enigmatic fact, I aim to further 
explore why countries so rarely emerge from civil war as robust democracies. 
Something is wrong with democratization and peace-building. This paper 
intends to bring to light central dilemmas originating from the efforts of 
building peace and democracy in fragile states after war. The focus is on the 
war-to-peace transitions through democracy and the objective is to anticipate 
how to avoid failed states or anocracies that can fuel the cycle of more conflict. 
We will concentrate on understanding the tensions and contradictions in post-
conflict functions, the challenges facing interim governments and the role of 
the international community. Needless to say: democratization is not all about 
the ballot vote. Nevertheless, elections remain a crucial pillar of democracy 
and particularly violent prone after-war. With that aim in mind, we will first 
 
 9. Nancy Bermeo, What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About 
Postwar Democratization, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 159, 160 (2003). 
 10. Monica Duffy Toft, Peace Through Security: Making Negotiated Settlements Stick, 4 
(2003), http://www3.carleton.ca/csds/docs/Toft%20PTS.pdf. 
 11. See generally Bermeo, supra note 9. 
 12. TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 
(Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001); WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN 
END TO CIVIL WARS (The Brookings Inst. 1995). 
 13. See generally Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014 (2014), 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2014-Global-Peace-Index-REPORT_ 
0-1.pdf. 
 14. See Håvard Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political 
Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 44 (Mar. 2001). 
 15. Timothy D. Sisk, Peace-building as Democratization Findings and Recommendations, 
in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 239, 243 (Anna K. Jarstad & 
Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008). 
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analyze the set of structural and common dilemmas of peace-building and 
democratization in the aftermath of civil war, as temporal, systemic, 
horizontal, and vertical dilemmas. The paper contributes theoretically to the 
body of knowledge by advancing the paradoxes faced by democratization and 
peace-building with additional 8 dilemmas: security, safety, mortal, 
sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. Secondly, the 
different dilemmas will be addressed in relation to elections. Thirdly, 
constitutionalism is a sine qua non mechanism for establishing the “social 
contract” based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the 
processes of democratization and peace-building are promoted by international 
actors who also face their own range of varying and even mutually 
contradictory dilemmas. Due to size restriction for publication, this paper has 
focused on must-have pillars of democratization. A subsequent paper could 
analyze the set of post-civil war dilemmas regarding transformation of political 
parties, power sharing, transitional justice, human rights, civil society as well 
the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of warring 
groups. 
II.  DILEMMAS AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND 
DEMOCRACY 
Nowadays, war cessation is predominantly about building anew or about 
rebuilding functioning, secure, stable, and democratic (or ‘‘republican’’) 
states.16 Beyond fixing fragile states, how does one make a state work after 
state failure and governance crisis?17 In this vein, power-sharing comes as an 
alternative to partition. The popular formula of democracy building for the 
transition from war-to-peace is: elections, new constitution, parliamentary 
politics by political parties, creation of independent judicial institutions, and 
revival of civil society to plague for reconstruction, reconciliation, and human 
rights. 
Studies on democratization lead to the impression that democracy itself is 
part of the problem and, therefore, that it plays against itself.18 Post-war 
societies are too fragile to be exposed to the competitive pressures of the 
electoral process. Democratization intrinsically subverts established political 
orders, allows new entrants to access the political system, highlights social 
cleavages, challenges existing power relations, and threatens incumbent 
 
 16. See Michael Barnett, Rebuilding a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War, 30 
INT’L SEC. 87, 87–88 (Spring 2006). 
 17. See generally Simon Chesterman, Peace and Security: The Use of Force to Maintain 
Law and Order, in YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, 
AND STATE-BUILDING (Simon Chesterman et al. eds., 2005); See generally KAPLAN, supra note 
5. 
 18. See MARCEL GAUCHET, LA DEMOCRACIA CONTRA SÍ MISMA (Homo Sapiens 2004). 
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authority. Consequently, transition to democracy is tumultuous, uncertain, and 
often a dangerous business.19 The primary problem is the creation of a 
legitimate public order. As well explored by the literature, men may have order 
without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.20 
Anocracies shows that if democracy is half-way, it can be more perilous 
than the regime that originally stood prior to intervention.21 In quasi-
democracies there is a high level of probability of intra or interstate conflict 
that consequently makes fragile states a source of security preoccupation. 
Authoritative or democratic systems can be less-war prone. It is the level of 
inclusiveness of the political system that results on stability or instability.22 
Highly inclusive systems, such as the proportional representation system, are 
more stable than low inclusive systems that favor political exclusion, such as 
the majoritarian system. Empirically, it seems that democracy per se is not 
enough to deter social conflicts. 
On the one hand, there is the urgency of war termination. On the other 
hand, there is the languid process of democracy building. Therefore, a key 
dilemma common to nearly all post-war contexts is the trade-off between short 
and longer-term goals of peace-building and democratization. On the delicate 
choice between peace and democracy, peace is the ultimate goal of war. 
Democracy crowns the success of state building missions. But, an absence of, 
or too little democracy may put peace in a challenging position and war might 
recur. At this stage, the examination of processes of pre-international 
intervention and post-intervention continues to be unsatisfactory. The greatest 
paradox between democracy and peace is: in one prism democracy as a 
political system is associated with peaceful conflict management, both within 
and between states. In another prism, the path to democracy is ironically often 
conflict-ridden.23 Peace-building and democratization are dynamic processes. 
 
 19. ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 45 (2004); 
Benjamin Reilly, Post-War Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition, in FROM WAR TO 
DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 157, 157 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk 
eds., 2008). 
 20. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN NEW WORLD 
POLITICS 253–54 (1977); Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, Constitutionalism and Foundational Values: 
Philippine Constitutional Authoritarianism Revisited, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF WORLD PEACE: LOGIC AND TINKERING 289, 300 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1993); See 
generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO 
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 241–42 (1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN 
CHANGING SOCIETIES 7–8 (1968). 
 21. BROCK, supra note 3, at 136. 
 22. Marta Reynal-Querol, Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars?, 21 EUR. J. OF POL. ECON. 
445, 446 (2005). 
 23. Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk, Introduction, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: 
DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 1, 1 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008); See 
generally Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Dangers of War, 20 
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The challenges confronting international and local actors when establishing or 
re-establishing good governance must also be further elucidated. 
When the pen fails, the sword rules. For Mukherjee, introducing 
democracy in conflict-ridden societies may decrease the possibility of failure 
of peace.24 As per the security dilemma, warring factions need to persuade 
each other and the citizens that they are ready to take turns in ruling the 
country: that means alternation of power. They also need to persuade citizens 
that political lawlessness and violence will be eliminated if they are elected. 
Simultaneously law enforcement institutions, such as an effective police force 
and a criminal justice system, as well as political institutions, for instance 
depoliticized judiciary and electoral commission, must be developed. Without 
those institutions, democracy will fail as the promise of security for citizens or 
political rights for the warring factions will be only words and no deeds.25 
As per definition, a dilemma is a situation in which a choice must be made 
between alternatives that are equally undesirable. The literature on 
democratization or international intervention that approaches efficacy and 
efficiency is not fully adequate to the specific conjecture of post-war situations 
where decisions are made between what is possible or less unscrupulous. 
According to Jarstad and Sisk, it is possible to subcategorize into 4 groups the 
dilemmas that may arise when the processes of democratization and peace-
building oppose each other.26 Peace-building may involve restrictions on 
democratic freedoms such as freedom of the press and mass demonstrations. In 
the long run, such constraints may cause turbulence and not only have an 
adverse influence on democratization, but also turn into an obstacle for 
implementation of the peace agreement. As civil war negotiations succeed, 
obstacles of democratization arise as state representatives or rebel forces faces 
uncertainty on how to protect their vital interests in the future through 
democratic processes – particularly but not exclusively elections.  
 
INT’L SEC. 5, 5–38 (Summer 1995); See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 27–31 (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2000). 
 24. See generally Bumba Mukherjee, Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to 
Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?, 50 INT’L Q. 479, 479–504 
(Jun. 2006). 
 25. Wantchekon, supra note 8. 
 26. Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
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Table 1: Central dilemmas of democratization and peace-building suggested by 
Jarstad and Sisk 
Dilemma Trade-off Description 
Horizontal Inclusion vs. 
exclusion 
Relation between the elites of warring 
parties and democratic political parties. 
Difficult choice on who is participant in the 
processes. 
Vertical Efficacy vs. 
legitimacy 
Relation between the elite and mass 
politics. Difficult choice on the legitimacy 
of actors and the efficacy of achieving 
peace and democracy. 
Systemic Local vs. 
international 
ownership 
Relation between the national and 
international expertise and resources. 
Democratization as well as peace-building 
needs to be driven by local motives and 
actors and not imposed or led by outsiders. 
Temporal Short-term vs. 
long-term 
Relation between short-term and long-term 
initiatives. Efforts to support 
democratization may in the short-term 
increase the risk of violence, and thereby in 
the long-term undermine the chances for 
democracy to take root. 
No examples were found where only one dilemma is in place at a time. 
Therefore, the analysis and understanding entail an interacting helical 
cogwheel perspective: one dilemma leads to one or more additional dilemmas 
even more critical of a complex conundrum. As an example, institutions 
building simultaneously involve temporal, vertical, and systemic dilemmas. 
The transition war-to democratic peace requires hard choices. Some are related 
to “when, where, who, and why” (moral dilemma of intervention), others to 
“what, how, whose, which, how many, and how much” (dilemmas arising from 
intervention). For example, too little military intervention or intervention that 
comes too late, as the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda has 
demonstrated, is problematic. A promise of intervention not acted upon is even 
worse, as in the African Great Lakes. Yet there is also such a thing as over-
intervention; the heavy-handedness of the UN intervention in Somalia 
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hampered efforts to gain acceptance from the population and may have been 
inefficacious.27 
In this paper, my objective is to postulate that it is possible to further 
contribute to the body of knowledge by advancing the analysis on the trade-
offs and paradoxes faced by democratization and peace-building by proposing 
additional dilemmas to those proposed by Jarstad and Sisk.28 
Table 2: Additional dilemmas of democratization and peace-building proposed 
by the author (I. Pereira Watts) 
Dilemma Trade-off Description 
Security 
Lost certainty 
vs. 
Win uncertainty 
To struggle for power or negotiate 
for freedom? Perhaps this is the 
most central dilemma: war 
certainty vs. peace uncertainties. As 
per popular proverbs, “a bird in the 
hand is worth two in the bush” or 
“a living dog is better than a deal 
lion” or “better one bird in the hand 
than ten in the wood.” 
Contrariwise, in war situations, it 
might not be better to have a lesser 
but certain advantage than the 
possibility of a greater one that may 
come to nothing. It is related to the 
perceived or feared losses such as 
of existence, property, prestige, 
position, and security. 
I argue that success in civil war 
termination concerned with ending 
the violence and establishing the 
political space for enduring peace 
requires a balance of carrots and 
sticks.  
To be part of the democratic game 
and maybe win versus to stay in 
war and maybe lose. By nature, 
 
 27. See Christina G. Badescu, Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard Choices in 
Saving Strangers, 40 CANADIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 51, 67 (2007); Mohamed Sahnoun, Mixed 
Intervention in Somalia and the Great Lakes: Culture, Neutrality, and the Military, in HARD 
CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 87, 95–98 (Jonathan Moore ed., 
1998). 
 28. Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
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enemies cannot trust that the other 
side will uphold an agreement in 
democratic governance after a 
winner-take-all election, and would 
make the loser-side vulnerable and 
therefore not willing to 
compromise to the peace 
agreement. There is an existential 
connotation. There is a fear that a 
rival will become stronger after an 
election and will monopolize the 
state power and weaken or target 
those who lose elections. Linked 
with the “certainty dilemma”, if the 
results were certain, elections 
would be unnecessary. The element 
of uncertainty makes adversaries 
willing to play by the rules of the 
democratic game even if they 
might lose, as they also might win. 
But it is precisely the uncertainty 
that might lead to violence. Power-
sharing increases the likelihood that 
adversaries will remain committed 
to the peace on a win-win situation 
instead of a winner-takes-all 
system. 
Moral 
Cause 
and 
Effect 
Anything that is ethically related to 
“right and wrong”. Is it right to do 
it? A decision can be right and end 
up having devastating 
consequences. 
Hazards of legalism and moralism 
have often inflamed discussion of 
governance, and their analyses are 
rooted directly within 
contemporary human struggles for 
peace and justice. These include 
predicaments of jus in bellum, jus 
ad bellum, and most of all it is 
concerned with jus post bellum. 
It concerns dichotomies as to 
follow the rules versus to maximize 
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the good or minimize the bad. 
Nature of duty and obligation 
(deontology) vs. prioritizing on the 
outcomes of the decision 
(consequentialist). Ethical 
dilemmas relating to humanitarian 
intervention are hard choices 
because they are both unavoidable 
and complex. They are unavoidable 
inasmuch as there are no ready-
made recipes to test the morality of 
any given aspect of international 
relations. Some examples: 1) 
Intervention and aggravate war vs. 
non-intervention and allow 
genocide, 2) sovereignty vs. 
responsibility to protect, 3) 
consistency vs. coherence 
(selective intervention vs. non-
intervention) 4) Be impartial vs. 
taking sides. 5) Approve sanctions 
to enforce international law vs. 
minimizing peoples suffer in 
conflict. 6) Personal interests vs. 
humanitarian assistance, 7) 
institutional image vs. investigation 
and consequences 8) Strategic 
logistical humanitarian alliance 
with military perpetrators vs. loss 
of credibility with victims, 9) 
effective personal humanitarian 
work vs. keep the salary contract 
for a longer term.  
Safety 
To get 
involved 
vs. 
not involved 
To go versus not to go to the polls. 
There is a connotation related to the 
protection of the citizen against 
violence when exercising its civil 
rights. Elections (pre-election, 
during, and post-elections phases) 
can be very violent and the 
population may be threatened or 
intimidated to go or to boycott the 
polls or even pressured to 
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overthrow the election results. 
Voters face a mix of feelings such 
as fears, uncertainty, and 
expectations in the future. Very 
often the available literature does 
not distinguish between security 
and safety and overstates them as 
one single dilemma. 
Sequencing 
Bottom-up 
vs. 
up-down 
What comes first? For example: To 
start the democratization process 
from the national level (with 
national elections) versus from the 
local/district level (local elections). 
Another alternative believes that 
democratization is a hybrid process 
where bottom-up and up-down 
dynamics should be simultaneous. 
Design 
Technical 
vs. 
political 
choices 
Technical expertise can be 
undermined by political choices of 
a predominant warlord. The choice 
of electoral system is one of the 
most important political decisions 
of a new country. Decision on the 
democratic rules of the game must 
be made between majoritarian or 
proportional systems and on the 
responsible authority to run it 
through independent or political 
Commission. Favoring a system 
may result on favoring a political 
axis, and therefore jeopardizing the 
credibility and legitimacy of the 
elections. Encouraging 
ethnic/religious/political 
polarization is undemocratic and 
can endanger the peace process 
with a return to violence.  
Transparency  
 
 
 
 
Truth for illegitimacy for a lie for 
stability? 
A choice must be made between 
truth and conflict versus untruth 
and stability. Transparency is also 
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Impartiality 
vs. 
Liability 
 
related to peace agreement 
negotiation, which are usually 
made inside closed doors and by a 
“petit comitée”. Too much 
transparency can ruin the peace 
process. But too little can 
undermine democracy. Example: 
The media can play two roles. It 
can be democratic or a toll of 
warlords (media coup d’état) when 
brain-washing voters through 
information and clarification or 
through intimidation and fear or 
even through money by paying for 
their support. As part of the 
transition, “media reform” is 
usually part of the agenda on 
democratization but is against the 
interests of the warlords as includes 
law on freedom of expression, 
human rights advocacy, formation 
of independent media, and training. 
‘‘Peace media’’ promotes a more 
effective and “democratic” media 
after war with the interruption of 
dissemination of “hate media”.  
Financial 
Present 
vs. 
Future 
 
Democracy and money have 
different timeframes: the first is a 
long-term process. The later ideally 
looks for short-term results. In the 
aftermath of war, the country is 
devastated and no state financial or 
fiscal institution is in place to 
manage the remaining natural 
resources or to collect tax from the 
survivors. International funds to 
implement peacekeeping mission 
are size restricted and time-limited. 
The dilemma is how to implement 
state structure without money. 
Different from the systemic 
dilemma related to ownership, 
financial-fiscal dilemma is 
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operational and related to the actual 
production or management of state 
revenue: either borrow and create a 
public debt and dependency or to 
do only what is manageable with 
the available resources until the 
creation of a proper tax collection 
system.   
Resources 
Efficiency 
vs. 
Viability 
 
The preambles toward democracy 
usually revert to autocracy or to 
anocracy in countries that have 
very low incomes and literacy 
and/or are oil-based economies. 
Should they use the natural 
resources left now to reconstruct 
infrastructure and a nation or 
should it be kept for the future and 
have nothing now? Resources also 
include capable human resources, 
who normally are taken over by 
international “experts”. Very often, 
the use of national resources is 
filled by corruption schemes due to 
the lack of transparency on the 
mechanisms of decision-making 
and execution. Additionally, the 
lack of basic infra-structure, leads 
to a logistical dilemma that 
impedes the democratization 
processes of elections and justice. 
Issues like corruption and gender permeate all of the dilemmas. By 
advancing the body of knowledge and to better visualize as well as to make 
room for deeper analysis, Graph 1 summarizes a new proposal of an 
interrelated set of dilemmas that are faced when trying to build peace and 
democracy in the aftermath of war in fragile states. I believe that awareness of 
the existence of those challenges is already a step towards a better approach on 
conflict resolution and more effective and durable transition to democratic 
peace. 
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Graph 1: New advanced set of dilemmas of democratization and peacebuilding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  ELECTIONS: FROM THE BATTLEFIELD OF WAR TO BATTLEFIELD OF THE 
BALLOT BOX 
In war-to-democracy transitions, elections are a pivotal issue and are 
widely seen as an integral part of the process of war termination, international 
(dis)engagement, and nation building. The electoral process is a mechanism for 
generating internal legitimacy for peace agreements. The establishment or 
reinstatement of political order by some form of legitimate authority is utmost 
in any transition from conflict to peace.29 
After war, elections are not just a lottery or a coin flipping operation 
towards peace. The electoral processes require critical choices over the 
sequencing of elections, the electoral system formula, the nature of elections 
(e.g., to a legislature, constituent assembly, or both), and other critical election-
related issues such as application of citizenship laws and even the redesign of 
electoral zones within the devastated territory. By searching for ideal 
conditions under which to contribute to both goals, wrong choices on the 
electoral processes may promote democratization but undermine peace, or 
prioritize peace-building but fail in democratization. Contemporary peace 
 
 29. Reilly, supra note 19. 
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agreements include post-war elections as means of conflict management. 
Nonetheless, it often becomes a source of increasing tension and renewed 
violence due to a combination of factors such as: lack of coordination 
problems, information asymmetries, reinforcing of societal divisions, as well 
as a mix of voters’ feelings of fears, uncertainty, and expectations for the 
future. Moreover, a profound ‘‘safety dilemma’’ affects both voters and 
candidates, whereby competing ethnic, religious, and political actors cements a 
polarization of society. For instance, spoilers may use violence to disrupt the 
transition process or to overthrow the election result as their power is 
threatened by democratic elections. Other actors may use violence as a tool, by 
preventing some actors from participating in the election campaign or by 
intimidating people from going to the polls, as coercive methods to interfere on 
the polls and the election outcome. 
Naively, elections, as well as peacekeeping missions, are expected to be a 
cure for all: “terminating civil wars; the transformation of warring armies into 
peaceful political parties; stimulation of the development of ‘‘normal’’ politics; 
choosing members of a legislature or other kind of representative assembly; 
forming a government; and conferring legitimacy upon the new political 
order,” consolidation of democracy, abolition of corruption and creation of 
opportunities for economic reconstruction.30 Elections represent the crowning 
event of the post-war peace-building phase, enabling the reestablishment of 
legitimate domestic authority, and allowing international forces to disengage 
and, in most cases, depart. On the contrary, post-war elections have often 
fomented these tensions, particularly if it threatens elites when the expansion 
of popular participation precedes the formation of and consolidation of 
political parties. So, polls can represent a danger to peaceful state building. The 
preambles toward democracy usually revert to autocracy or to anocracy in 
countries that have very low income and literacy levels, weak state institutions, 
deep ethnic divisions, or oil-based economies with no strong institutional 
antidotes in place.31 
When and how can elections advance stability in peace processes or 
exacerbate conflicts? As mentioned by Kumar, “most war-torn societies lack 
the political climate, social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure, 
 
 30. Reilly, supra note 19, at 157–58. 
 31. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, When ballots bring on bullets; Democratic 
deceptions II, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2005); See Virginia Page Fortna, Peacekeeping and 
democratization, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING, 39, 63 (Anna 
K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds. 2008); The Role of Elections in Peace Processes: When and 
How they Advance Stability or Exacerbate Conflicts, UNSSC (2011), available at www.unssc. 
org. 
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and even political will to mount successful elections.”32 Under what 
circumstances can elections help in building a new, peaceful, democratic order 
and under what circumstances can they undermine prospects for stable 
democracy and pave the way for a return to conflict? In post-conflict 
situations, several questions arise: When to hold elections? How the electoral 
system should be? Who can vote and be voted? What are the procedures? Who 
designs and decides the process? Those questions can be translated through the 
following trade-offs: competitive elections versus conflict management; short- 
versus long-term electoral objectives; efficiency versus inclusion in terms of 
government structure; sequenced versus simultaneous local, regional, and 
national-level elections; party-based versus independent forms of electoral 
administration; and the need to build local accountability versus development 
of national party politics, together with finance, moral, and transparency 
dilemmas. 
Success in relation to war termination does not necessarily mark 
‘‘success’’ relative to democratization. Liberia embodies this impasse: the 
1997 flawed elections created more problems than they solved. But in 2005, 
following the country’s second civil war, elections marked the end of the 
transition and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came to power as Africa’s first 
democratically elected female head of state. In October 2015, Ivoirians went 
peacefully to the polls, after the bloodiest elections in 2010 that left 3000 dead. 
Post-war elections in Namibia in 1989, El Salvador in 1994, or Mozambique in 
1994 played a vital role in making a decisive path towards peace. Delaying 
elections can also prove fundamental in order to develop political structures 
and enable the legitimization of the results as on the cases of East Timor and 
Kosovo. 
By contrast, elections in Afghanistan and Iraq have not led to an end to 
hostilities and, inversely, have intensified the continuing conflict. Furthermore, 
technical success may not be sufficient. In 1993, United Nations administered 
polls in Cambodia and despite the technical success, the ‘‘losing’’ party 
returned to power as a “winner” via coercive maneuvers.33 Angola (1992) and 
Sierra Leone (1996 with the first multi-party election held in the country since 
1977), led to a resumption of warfare as a result, in part, of the threats these 
elections represented to incumbent elites. Similarly, attempts to foster peace 
and stability in Rwanda by promoting political liberalization, prospection of 
elections and ethnic power sharing ultimately backfired, in the worst possible 
way, leading to the 1993 genocide. In Bosnia, post-war elections cemented in 
 
 32. Krishna Kumar, Postconflict Elections and International Assistance, in POSTCONFLICT 
ELECTIONS, DEMOCRATIZATION & INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 5, 7 (Krishna Kumar ed., 
1998). 
 33. MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: 
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 222–23 (2006); Reilly, supra note 19, at 158. 
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power essentially nondemocratic elites and who had been leaders in the prior 
conflict. In Ethiopia (1994 and 2000) and Uganda (2006 and 2011; note 
Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986), elections were subverted to a 
toll to legitimize the victory of the winning parties to the conflict. 
Elections can also be a façade for a so called “warlord democracy.”34 
Sudan is a quintessential case. Following the Second Sudanese Civil War 
(1983–2005) and the war in Darfur, Sudan is widely recognized as an 
authoritarian state where all effective political power is obtained by President 
Omar al-Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). In 1989, 
Colonel Omar al-Bashir led a bloodless military coup. In 1993, al-Bashir 
appointed himself “President” and took both executive and legislative powers 
of the Revolutionary Command Council. Sudan became a single-party state 
with a new parliament and government obtained solely by members of the 
NCP. In the 1996 general election, by law, al-Bashir was the only candidate. 
Despite his international arrest warrant, al-Bashir was a candidate in the 2010 
Sudanese presidential election, with multiple political parties participating for 
the first time in twenty-four years. Al-Bashir was declared the winner of the 
election with 68% of the vote. International Crisis Group reported that the 
ruling party had gerrymandered electoral districts.35 That means it used 
political electoral tactics in the process of setting electoral districts to establish 
a political advantage by manipulating district boundaries to create partisan 
advantaged districts. Intimidation was reported from voters and the main 
opposition candidate, Yasir Arman (SPLM), withdrew from the race days 
before the poll. Additionally, the electoral vote tabulation process was reported 
by the Carter Center as “highly chaotic, non-transparent, and vulnerable to 
electoral manipulation.”36 
Although elections are not synonym of democracy, it is a condicio sine qua 
non of the political system and therefore faces specific dilemmas on the 
transition from war-to-peace. In this same vein of analysis, elections in Uganda 
represent the dilemma between peace and democracy: the system puts an end 
to political violence and unites and stabilizes the country but does not promote 
a so-called “liberal democracy.”37 
 
 34. See generally Wantchekon, supra note 8, at 24, 31. 
 35. Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, 
INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ 
sudan/b072-rigged-elections-in-darfur-and-the-consequences-of-a-probable-ncp-victory-in-
sudan.aspx. 
 36. Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan’s Vote Tabulation and 
Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency, THE CARTER CTR. (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-051010.html. 
 37. Reilly, supra note 19. 
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a) Temporal, financial, resources, and safety dilemmas as exit strategy: 
When and how to hold elections? 
Should elections be held early even with the risk that extremists may 
legitimately win power or should they be postponed until the society is less 
polarized?38 Elections are held often within a year or two of the start of a UN 
mission or of a cease-fire, as it requires a minimum level of security and a 
basic level of infrastructure in place. This is followed by a rapid hand-over to 
the newly elected local authorities, and an even exit-strategy for a more rapid 
departure of international troops and personnel. ‘‘Premature elections’’ can be 
counter-productive: in general, the early application of elections immediately 
following a conflict increases the likelihood that the contest will become a de 
facto contest between the former warring armies masquerading as political 
parties. A classic case of “instant elections’’ is that of the November 1996 
election in Bosnia. Besides the pressure to start the development of a national 
political process, the stress was largely provoked by the Clinton administration 
in order to show progress in the Balkans in time for mid-term elections in the 
United States. By contrast, an extended process of consultations and local-level 
peace-building may offer better prospects for a peaceful transition in post-war 
societies. The real interests and concerns that provoked the conflict should be 
addressed in a step-by-step fashion before national elections are held. East 
Timor and Kosovo had delayed elections and stated from municipal pools, 
allowing a gradual step towards democratization. 
Authors like Roland Paris defend the postponement of elections, often for 
a two-year period.39 They claim that before holding elections, priority should 
be given to the development of moderate political parties and of a judicial 
mechanism to regulate disputes on electoral-related issues in order to establish 
conditions for holding free and fair elections. However, by postponing, 
opportunities to support the closure of war may be left behind irreversibly.40 
Without solid institutional ground, the process of democratization is halted or 
overturned by threats and intimidation from actors seeking to disrupt the 
transition, overthrow the election results, or prevent election campaigns or 
voters from going to the polls. If so, that also alerts the “safety dilemma”. 
Besides deciding when – how early or how late – to put in place the ballot 
box, another temporal-sequential dilemma arises: should the start of authority 
legitimization be bottom-up or up-down? If national elections are held before 
 
 38. Kristine Hoglund, Violence in war-to-democracy transitions, in FROM WAR TO 
DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING, 80, 91 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk 
eds., 2008). 
 39. PARIS, supra note 19, at 190. 
 40. See Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs, When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in 
Post-War Politics, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 134, 138 
(Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008). 
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local ones it facilitates the introduction of civic education routine of electoral 
politics and party politics in new democracies. Furthermore, national elections 
generate incentives for the formation of central, rather than regional, political 
parties as well as a formal national authority to deal with the international 
actor.41 However, to first-test through municipal or local elections before 
national seems more suitable for the transitional elections towards a bottom-up 
democracy building perspective. Nevertheless, for the development of a strong 
and integrated political party system, national, regional, and local elections 
should be run simultaneously.42 Additionally, it is more financially viable as it 
uses the same logistical efforts. That also leads to a “financial dilemma”: if 
democracy is a long-term process, international funds to implement 
peacekeeping mission are limited and work against the clock. That explains 
why elections are usually held as early as possible in peace keeping operations. 
Due to financial pressures, many missions have an incentive to withdraw their 
presence as soon as there are some home-grown institutions, such as 
representative legislatures and multiethnic peace and security forces that create 
both the shell of a state and a legitimate political body for the international 
community to deal with. Here, financial, resources, safety, and temporal 
dilemmas go hand-in-hand. 
Graph 2: Electoral temporal dilemma: hard choices between doing good for 
peacekeeping or for democratization 
                                               Elections 
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100,100, 101 (1996). 
 42. Larry Jay Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, 5 J. OF DEMOCRACY 4, 8–9 
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b) Systemic and design dilemmas: Defining the results before the 
elections 
In the aftermath of conflict, domestic political institutions are weak or non-
existent, voters are suspicious, and elites’ hold on power is feeble. Under this 
environment, how should the electoral system be in post-conflict? First, 
elections can be strategically and calculatingly designed to encourage not zero-
sum, winner-take-all outcomes, but rather the sharing of power between 
groups. In most of the cases, election results are decided before the election by 
defining the rules of the game; that represents a peril of making a façade for 
the return to old patriarchal system or warlords. 
Secondly, the objectives of the referenda are different when related to 
independence or self-determination from a phased or gradual series of 
consultations. Therefore, the goal will determine the rules of the game that 
refer to the “design dilemma”: usually choices are among plurality-majority, 
semi-proportional, and proportional representation (PR) systems. Amid 
plurality systems are first-past-the-post, runoff, block, and alternative vote 
systems. By contrast, proportional representation systems characteristically use 
larger, multi-member districts and deliver more proportional outcomes and 
include ‘‘open’’ and ‘‘closed’’ versions of party list PR, as well as ‘‘mixed-
member’’ and ‘‘single transferable vote’’ systems. Over the past decade, many 
new democracies opt for the semi-proportional systems such as the single non-
transferable vote as it offers “hybrid” approaches: mixtures of plurality and 
proportional models by which part of the parliament is elected via PR and part 
from local districts. In this vein, UN-administered elections seem to largely 
prefer the Party-list PR as it has been frequently used as in the cases of 
Mozambique (1994), Liberia (1997), Bosnia (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002), Kosovo 
(2001), Sierra Leone (2002), Rwanda (2003), and Iraq (2005). The main reason 
for national PR systems is logistical, taking into consideration that a) a uniform 
national ballot can be used, b) same electoral districts can be used, and c) most 
of all, the different phases of the process (voter registration, vote counting, and 
the calculation of results) are simplified compared to other methods. 
Obviously, the choice of electoral system is one of the most important 
political decisions for any country and will also influence others aspects of the 
political system such as the development of the party system, linkages between 
citizens and their leaders, political accountability, representation, and 
responsiveness by electoral choices in a context where there is probably no 
new constitution or electoral law set yet. Favoring such a system may result in 
favoring a political party/candidate, and therefore jeopardizing the credibility 
of the elections. Some systems can also have the effect of fragmenting the 
legislature and marginalizing minority groups. Encouraging ethnic polarization 
amongst the electorate is undemocratic and can lead to animosities and, 
therefore, endanger the peace process. Illustrating this, the 2005 Afghan 
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parliamentary elections featured over 5,800 candidates – in Kabul alone the 
ballot paper displayed over 400 names – resulting in a fractionalized and 
incoherent parliament that is likely to remain highly divided and unable to 
coordinate around pressing policy challenges. The choice for Single non-
transferable vote (SNTV) advantaged smaller parties. Competition within the 
party brings to the surface personal characteristics that make the development 
of a party system in the short term improbable. 
Thirdly, according to Adam Przeworski, democracy is a political 
arrangement that processes but never definitely resolves social conflicts.43 
Under this premise, “a functioning democracy serves as a system of conflict 
management, with potential conflicts channeled into constitutional arenas, such 
as non-violent competition between political parties, rather than armed conflict 
on the streets.”44 These arguments are reinforced by empirical studies that 
emphasize the success of consolidated democracies in accommodating social 
cleavages and tensions through peaceful means.45 Reilly explains that 
democracy pleas for this “certainty of uncertainty” to provoke trustworthiness 
from all players and to be sustainable on the long term.46 The “certainty 
dilemma” is what makes adversaries willing to play by the rules of the 
democratic game even if they might lose. Through mechanisms that distribute 
state power among former armed adversaries in a manner that prevents any 
group from becoming dominant, as no single entity will use the power of the 
state in a way that promotes its interests while threatening the security of 
others on a “winner takes all” election model. In this perspective, power-
sharing increases the likelihood that adversaries will remain committed to the 
peace. But then again, in post-war societies, the uncertainty of election results 
is in itself a source of violence, and a major threat to incumbent elites that can 
make them wary of committing to the game at all. It is related to the fear that, 
“(1) a rival is likely to become stronger following an election that places its 
hands on the levers of state power; and (2) the rival may then use that authority 
to weaken or otherwise target those who lose elections.”47 There are several 
models of election administration that can mainly be grouped as independent 
or party-based. 
Who has the role and responsibilities to organize the elections? Another 
impasse is related to the role and responsibilities in charge of the bodies 
running the elections. This intensifies two dilemmas: structural and systemic. 
 
 43. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10–11 (Jon Elster & Michael S. McPherson 
eds., 1991). 
 44. Reilly, supra note 19, at 165. 
 45. Hegre et al., supra note 14, at 34. 
 46. Reilly, supra note 19, at 165. 
 47. Hartzell & Hoodie, supra note 7, at 47. 
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Besides the large literature on democracy and electoral reforms, electoral 
administration in post-war remains understudied. There are different choices to 
allocate responsibility of administration of elections that are usually: 1) 
creation of independent, non-partisan and specific body; 2) within a 
government portfolio, like the ministry of interior affairs; 3) within 
government agencies, such as the public records office, the tax department, or 
even the postal service; 4) creation of a new body before each electoral event 
(ad hoc); and, 5) under the United Nations (as in Cambodia in 1993 or East 
Timor in 2001). The first three alternatives are under the umbrella of the 
structure along with the electoral system choice. However, very often, there is 
no infrastructure, technical expertise or even legitimacy to be run by national 
actors. If internationally run the elections take place, there might be technical 
success and credibility, but also a lack of local ownership and a creation of a 
dependency relationship with outsiders, which is non-desirable at the 
embryonic phase of the democratic era. 
c) Vertical and horizontal dilemmas: Democracy to whom? 
Who can play the democratic game? The democratic system implies 
inclusion and equality. However, in post-conflict scenarios, including 
“everyone” might be unfair as well as a path towards the return to war. The 
inclusion of internally displaced peoples, refugees, and ex-combatants in the 
electoral process is a recurring dilemma in post-war elections.48 Can the 
victims or perpetrators vote and be voted? Consider the refugees, people who 
left the territory to be safe overseas. With a massive out-flow of refugees as in 
Syria, the Congo, and Rwanda, if they cannot vote due to being abroad, it 
might result in an exclusion of a great proportion of the population. The “Syria 
migration crisis” is a contemporary example. The exclusion of part of the main 
victims, an estimated in four million refugees in December 2015, can be unfair 
and also undemocratic.49 Those who have stayed might support the 
perpetrators to power that is out of benefit of only a few. 
Predictably, the situation immediately after the elections is particularly 
sensitive. It is of particular security concern if contenders will resort to 
violence unless they emerge as winners. Changing uniforms from a repressive 
regime or from a rebel group to political party suits does not automatically 
result in an increase in legitimacy. There is a potential concern in relation to 
security sector reform. If the same people that have committed atrocities 
become part of the new police force and government, legitimacy of the new 
 
 48. See Brett Lacy, Building Accountability, Legitimacy, and Peace: Refugees, Internally 
Displaced Persons, and the Right to Political Participation, INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS. 
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 49. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian 
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institutions may be demoralized. However, the recruitment of former rebels is 
needed to fill a security vacuum as well as to occupy former soldiers who are 
potential threats to peace if left unemployed. 
d) Transparency, moral, and vertical dilemmas: (un) peaceful, (un)free, & 
(un)fair media 
Once again, the dynamic in post conflict is very different from “normal” 
political conjectures. For competitive free and fair elections, fundamental 
political rights are required such as freedoms of movement and of speech. 
However, militant political organizations might misuse these rights. In 
particular, the competitive nature of elections may aggravate existing conflicts 
and societal cleavages. Political mobilization is likely to be along the conflict 
lines where differences rather than similarities are brought to the surface 
through revenge speeches. The electoral process is filled with military 
metaphors and fighting rhetoric such as: ‘campaigns’, employing ‘strategies 
and tactics’ approach to “win” votes, “cadre” as faithful Party, and 
‘strongholds’ or ‘citadels’ referred to areas with many supporters.50 Threat, 
intimidation, and violence are used to influence the electoral process. As 
explained from the safety dilemma, voters usually fear of being killed if the 
warlord does not win the elections. There is hope as well as disillusion on what 
the so-called “democracy” could result in. 
The vertical dilemma is very explicit in relation to free and transparent 
media. For the sake of legitimacy, involvement of the people in all phases of 
the peace and democratization processes is desirable. But for the sake of 
efficacy, certain negotiations need to be held behind literal closed-doors, and 
often secretly. Freedom of expression and press freedom are generally 
considered cornerstones of a democratic society and are also formulated as a 
fundamental human right in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.51 Nonetheless, in the course of armed conflict, media commonly 
becomes polarized and serves as a tool for propaganda to the conflict parties to 
foster hatred – often times with ethnic overtures –and to rapidly mobilize 
people for violence. The media can be a powerful tool and in the most extreme 
cases has played a crucial part in genocidal violence, as in Rwanda, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo. During conflict, the media becomes an extra party and in 
democratic times, it becomes a hidden fourth power after the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary as it directly influences the masses. In countries 
emerging from war, not only is there a lack of human resources trained on 
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journalism and capable on media resources, but also the system apparatus is 
owned by elites or warlords and the editors-in-chief are appointed by a single 
party. 
Additionally, to the legal parameters, ownership, transparency, capacity, 
infrastructure, and funding, accessibility is another struggle. With an average 
of 80% of the territory infrastructure destroyed and in poverty,52 the radio 
might be more suitable then television and newspaper where more technology 
and investment are needed. The genocide in Rwanda was mostly disseminated 
through the radio. Furthermore, apparently simple questions such as “which 
language should be used in the elections?” can be another example of battle. 
As a result of minorities having their voice excluded, lack of transparency, 
domination of one ethnic group over another, as well as favoritism, they 
become vulnerable and responsive to emotive tactics used in elections 
campaigns such as hatred speech and other measures employed to inflame 
constituents with the aim of producing a non-result. Timor-Leste is an example 
of a “tower of Babel”: with two official languages in the constitution, two 
other “working languages” during the transitional time, together with other 31 
local languages, the dissemination of new laws or even the establishment of an 
educational curriculum adds complexity to the already chaotic post-war 
transition. Similarities are found in places like Afghanistan, Georgia, and 
Guinea-Bissau. 
Moreover, the democratic values of the media are to be independent, non-
partisan, and laicist and its principles are to be impartial, accurate, and active. 
Therefore, in order to defend freedom of speech (without defamation), 
individual rights, free initiative, human rights, republican values, science 
innovation, and environmental protection it cannot be in favor of or against 
governments, religion, clubs, economic groups, or political parties. Crucial to 
democratic accountability, a functioning and diverse media should provide 
information to the citizens and critical scrutiny of political issues. 
New media like Internet and social media have created new waves of 
impact on democratization as the role of Facebook during the Arab spring and 
the organization of many political movements in Ukraine, Thailand, Hong 
Kong, and around the world demonstrate. The so-called “netocracy”, a 
symbiosis of Internet and democracy, shows its colossal power to influence 
millions of people in seconds. Some governments, like China and Russia, 
recognize this power and control the access to the Internet and social media 
within its territory. “Voter-generated-content”, such as videos on YouTube 
have been identified as a drift towards “videocracy’”. As examples, the 
election of Silvio Berlusconi as Italy’s Prime Minister in 1994 was seen by 
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many as a “media coup d’état” as well as overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu in 
1989 in the “first revolution on live television” in Romania. 
Therefore, as part of the transition, “media reform” is usually part of the 
agenda on democratization with a “media advisor officer” under the political or 
civil affairs department of the UN mission. It usually consists of efforts to 
create new laws guaranteeing freedom of expression as well as to restructure 
the media infrastructure including the formation of independent media and 
widening the range of media outlets and ownership.53 Training in what has 
been termed ‘‘peace media’’ has been gaining ground in peace-building 
efforts. Among so many “priorities” to build peace, democracy, and socio-
economic development, the “media reform” seems secondary and slow. The 
promotion of ‘‘codes of conduct’’ and licensing systems,54 and the interruption 
of the transmission or dissemination of hate media appears to be techniques to 
promote a more effective and “democratic” media after war. Therefore, besides 
the vertical and temporal trade-offs, costs and ownership of the media reform 
also alerts the systemic and financial dilemmas. Of course, it is easy to identify 
that the moral dilemma permeates all those previous dilemmas of transparency 
and anti-corruption measures as well as fairness and freedom of the process 
and of the actors are prerequisites. 
Democratization goes beyond the dilemmas surrounding elections. Human 
development is unlikely to progress in “anarchy” as they work best within 
well-functioning states. Contrariwise, failing and failed states are personalized 
by rulers that did not distinguish public from private realms and have become 
“kleptocracies,” (governments of thieves). The “rulers” are indeed predators 
and neither make nor enforce law. A new constitution must mirror the new 
reality to be able to enforce peace and the rule of law. Constitutionalism can be 
decisive to power-sharing but also faces several dilemmas concerning the 
choice of peace or democracy. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRACY & RULE OF LAW FOR WHOM? 
On one hand, according to Aristotle, man without law is the lowest of 
animals. On the other hand, as a Haitian saying goes, “Constitution is paper, a 
bayonet is iron.”55 Lawlessness is what characterizes the state of belligerence 
in war-torn countries. Either on a Hobbesian or Lockean approach, the main 
priority is to establish a political order, as democracy cannot bourgeon in the 
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absence of natural rights or in a state of anarchy.56 After war, a new country 
must be built. It requires new rules that reflect the new reality. It is a new 
social contract between the political-warring groups themselves and between 
the political-warring groups and the populaces. 
After war, a new constitution is usually written “for the People” and set in 
place to be obeyed “by the People”. One problem is “from which People” the 
constitution will be written and how the Constitutional Assembly will be 
established and legitimate. These problems have already been mentioned in the 
electoral section of this paper. As pondered by Falk et al., the constitutional 
foundations of “world peace” require logic and tinkering.57 Worldwide 
constitutional framework can be highly significant, both analytically and 
politically, in efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. Pitfalls of legalism and 
moralism have often afflicted discussion of governance, and their analyses are 
rooted directly within contemporary human struggles for peace, justice, 
prosperity, and environmentally sustainable societies. To make 
constitutionalism work, it must be well-designed to block tyrannies and 
protecting core rights of citizens from potential violations. Additionally, it 
must foresee public accountability mechanisms for officeholders by calling for 
rule-governed and transparent procedures during a time-limited mandate as 
well as dividing public authority among multiple offices and institutions. 
Power’s monopolization opposes power-sharing. Although it is common to 
delegate some power to maintain the monopoly, to delegate is not synonymous 
with sharing. Monopolies of power are found in tyrannies, despotisms, military 
autocracies, monarchies, theocracies, or one-party dictatorships. Democracy 
may also cohabitate with monopolistic domination if power of a ruling class or 
elite lies behind the façade of electoral competition for power. 
Is power sharing through constitutionalism the key for peace and 
democracy in the aftermath of conflict? To begin with, albeit potentially 
intersecting notions, it is important to differentiate four different concepts: 
power-sharing from power division as well as separation of power and 
competition for power.58 Although it is important to highlight those 
distinctions, it is fundamental to keep in mind that: when emphasizing the 
distribution of authority among former rivals, it is generally very difficult to 
establish certain attributes in states emerging from civil war that would be 
“normal” in “peaceful scenarios”. The first concept relates to structures of 
divided societies to govern jointly within specific organs or institutions. 
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Power-sharing suggests both coordinated and jointly shares of decision making 
and autonomy in group or territory. Power-sharers search for sharing power 
across national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups through their 
representatives making joint decisions in executives, legislatures, and 
judiciaries branches. Power-sharing is more than acknowledging that “what 
cannot be won on the battlefield is best allocated through a shared forum and a 
shared executive.”59 Power-sharers do not seek a social contract among a 
unified people as Rousseau’s proposal. It suggests a minimal civility among 
divided communities on “consociational form” or among territorial 
governments on a “federalism form”. 
Secondly, power division suggests a separation of power among the 
governmental organs of the common-state that can create more conflict, 
polarized society, and state within state structure. Power division implies that 
through division the parties receive shares that are individualized as communal 
politics. Civil liberties and multiple majorities are said to be central to power 
dividing. In practice, it results in an allocation of power between government 
and civil society such that the “most important issues that divide ethnic groups, 
but must be decided by a government common to all ethnic groups.”60 Thirdly, 
separation of power refers to the Montesquieu’s idea to avoid centralization of 
power and to forestall tyranny by a monarch or oligarchy. It is highly accepted 
to divide the state into at least three main branches with specific mandate that 
cannot be overlapped by another branch: legislative, executive, and judiciary. 
Separation does not advocate a coordinated policymaking system and is not 
organized to facilitate group organization. Separation of powers between the 
branches of government and a range of specialized agencies dealing with 
specific, and clearly delimited policy areas are to create multiple and changing 
majorities. Thus members of ethnic minorities can be parts of political 
majorities on some issues and members of any ethnic majority will be 
members of political minorities on other issues. As a mechanism of checks and 
balances, policy and order are expected to emerge from the clash of ambitious 
power-holders scattered across multiple institutions. 
Fourthly, elections are the democratic regulated tactic in the competition 
for power. The competition for power is a sine qua non of democratic 
government: a political system enshrined in a constitution in which officials 
compete for authoritative positions for limited terms in free and fair elections 
for citizens’ votes; hold office within constitutional norms that ensure 
accountability both through the ballot box and recourse to the courts. Elections 
for executive and legislative posts continue to be an alternative of preventing 
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nefarious monopoly. Conversely, judicial and administrative positions are 
often meritocratic promotion with transparent and reviewable procedures. 
O’Flynn and Russell affirm that among the new challenges for divided 
societies is to recognize that power share incorporated in “constitutional 
designs adopted at times of crisis are means to survival.”61 Constitutionalism 
can be the key to peaceful power-sharing as it is normally established in such 
foundational documents. Nonetheless, it does not mean that all constitutions 
are power-sharing systems. The abuse of political power is constitutionally 
possible. For example, the constitution may assign the authority to the 
plenitude of the executive power to a person, faction, or party, for a limited 
time. Emergency powers to a domination executive representation (faction, 
party, or national, religious, or ethnic group) might include provision of “war 
powers” for the suspension of basic rights and fundamental freedoms. Or it can 
be undemocratic in divided societies if the constitution excludes the plurality 
of beliefs, traditions and social relations by establishing the basis of eligibility 
for citizenship based on just one religion, one language, one ethnicity, or even 
gender. In the case of Myanmar, the 2010 Constitutional Reform towards a 
“discipline-flourishing democracy” was strategically planned by the military 
junta to prohibit Aung San Suu Kyi to run as president of the country. Or it 
may powerfully entrench some identities at the expense of others. A president 
or prime minister with such power may promote legislation that reflects only 
the preferences of the dominant nationality, race, religion, or linguistic group, 
and control the judiciary and administration with strategic appointees. Courts 
staffed and controlled by the same party of the executive may not act as 
guardians of individuals’ rights or of collective minorities. If so, the so-called 
“rule of law”, an important characteristic of the democratic system and of 
sustainable peace, it rapidly becomes repeatedly the rule of the dominant 
majority or faction in power, and, therefore, a return to the “rule of the gun”. 
By neglecting the separation of power, the balance of power loses its 
equilibrium. Worst, and very debatable, is the change in constitution that 
eliminates the principle of alternation of power. By allowing the head of State 
and/or Government to be re-elected ad aeternum, the basic democratic 
principle of alternation of power is undermined, and consequently undercuts 
the power sharing arrangements leading to authoritarianism and warlords in 
power. Uganda, as well as cases of non-civil wars but pseudo-democracies of 
the “Bolivarian Axis” (Cuba-Venezuela-Bolivia-Ecuador) are examples of the 
latter. Thus, the principle of periodic elections may become redundant if there 
is no political space for opposition and free and fair elections. 
In the aftermath of conflict, constitutionalism simultaneously faces four 
dilemmas: temporal (when), systemic (national ownership), horizontal (mass 
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representation), and vertical (political plurality). For McEvoy and O’Leary, 
“Constitutionalism per se does not prevent cultural homogeneity from 
becoming the hallmarks of policy and the state.”62 During war times, the 
constitution has been put on fire as a chunk of “useless” paper that no longer 
serve to the people. After war, the struggle is how to implement and enforce 
the new set of rules of the social contract. Formally or informally, 
constitutionalism is necessary to build democracy and long-term sustainable 
peace. However, in divided societies and in the aftermath of conflict, 
constitutionalism can be an illusion for successful power-sharing, rule of law, 
and protection of individual’s human rights. 
Last but not least, modern power-sharing is conceived by some of its 
enthusiasts as a necessary supplement to constitutionalism. Moreover, some 
scholars would suggest that that is the only option for democratic governance 
in the shadows of war.63 Power-sharing helps to establish what is crucial in the 
aftermath of civil war: a political order and collaboration between warring 
factions and elites. By inference, power-sharing would contribute to peace as 
well as democracy. However, as there is no fantasy way out of the legacy of 
war, power-sharing can be, in the long-term, a source of instability, ineffective 
governance by incompetent government, and violent conflict, and therefore, 
jeopardizes both processes of democratization and peace-building. On one 
side, inclusion of warring groups in government can facilitate peace as 
everyone can mutually rule through its share. On the other side, reserved seats 
for warring parties may undermine democratic legitimacy of silencing mass 
votes. Thus, if the peace agreement it is not well designed, power-sharing can 
stimulate violence. While an extensive amount of literature on democratization 
and checks and balances exists, power-sharing specific to post-conflict 
situation remains limited by Political Sciences and related disciplines of 
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies.64 According to Pippa Norris, power-
sharing institutions work.65 States with institutions that are consistent with 
power-sharing tend to perform better in terms of democracy. Power-sharing is 
an “anti-democratic mechanism” as it removes the influence of the masses as it 
previously distributes power among selected actors and rewards violence by 
granting warring parties positions.66 As mentioned by Hartzell and Hoddie, 
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“power-sharing itself is not inherently democratic.”67 But in a minimalist form 
of democracy, it represents the art of the possible. Due to the paper’s size 
restriction for publication, power sharing systems in the aftermath of conflict 
will be analyzed in another article. 
The democratic crusade promotes war and death.68 The difficulties that 
post–civil war conditions pose for a transition to democracy are usually 
underestimated. Therefore, (re)installation of democracy via war is a great 
contradiction. “Should the UN be in the business of ensuring democracy at the 
barrel of a gun?”69 In the transition from war to peace, how are the United 
Nations peace-building missions are involved democracy building? The UN’s 
role in promoting democracy often struggles between balancing ideals and 
reality.70 
V.  INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: OWNERSHIP OF THE PEACE-BUILDING AND 
DEMOCRACY BUILDING PROCESSES 
A variety of studies have demonstrated that United Nations peace 
operations significantly facilitate, and might even be a prerequisite for, lasting 
peace after civil wars.71 Nonetheless, the UN faces the problem of building 
democracy in war-torn societies in ways that are fundamentally 
undemocratic.72 Therefore, the dynamic and the dilemmas between peace 
interventions and democratization in post-conflict countries require further 
exploration to avoid the recurrence of the conflict and the vulnerability of 
fragile states. One of the main literature lacunas is that many studies limit their 
analysis to quantitative data in the short period of two or five years from the 
peace agreement signature to the conclusion of the peace operations.73 Peace-
building, democracy-building, state-building, and most of all, nation-building, 
suggest an extensive and complex process that is analogous as to a roller 
coaster. Therefore, with a coarse process filled with ups and downs, the 
efficiency or efficacy of the procedure and the different agents cannot be 
assessed as “snapshots.”74 
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United Nations understands that democratization includes: 1) support for 
constitutional and legal reforms, 2) the establishment of election 
administration, 3) training of election staff and media professionals, 4) political 
party assistance, 5) human rights monitoring and 6) civil society aid. All 
interventions and decisions related to ownership, empowerment as well as 
transparency are predominantly challenged by the principles of sovereignty 
and responsibility to protect (R2P). Regarding the dilemmas explained in 
section 1, international intervention experiments trade-offs are mainly related 
to moral, systemic, financial and temporal dilemmas. The triangular relation 
between war, democracy, and UN is surrounded by impasses, like sovereignty, 
ownership, and empowerment, as well as transparency. 
First, is the moral dilemma of intervention that points out the trade-off 
between sovereignty and responsibility to protect? From a broad theoretic 
viewpoint, interventions are international policies that from time to time 
violate international norms, occasionally support the incessant oppression of 
people, and sometimes bring armed violence to an end and perhaps they may 
pave the way towards peace and stability. Where the literature falls short is in 
explaining satisfactorily whether “sometimes” is “often”, or when facilitating 
peaceful settlements is more probable.75 Civil wars have turned out more and 
more frequently to be international events, as the case of Syria patently 
presents. Legality and legitimacy are the main oxymoron of international 
intervention in civil wars by the United Nations. In the perspective that war 
intervention is a continuation of politics by order, means that peacekeeping 
continues to be a complex element resulting in selective and collective 
humanitarian international intervention in intrastate wars. “Fixing” fragile 
states and solving civil war through peacekeeping permeates above and beyond 
the sovereignty quandaries. 
What makes a state a state is called sovereignty. So, what happens in the 
cases of failed states? On the one hand, Westphalians argue that failed states 
are “failed” precisely because they cannot enforce the sovereignty in their 
territory. If no sovereignty exists, therefore, international intervention is 
justified, as there is no empty space in politics as an extension of physics 
axioms. It is not an “intervention” per se, but an “occupation of misused or 
(un)used space,” and therefore, is legal and legitimate. Sovereignty, territory 
and borders cannot be dissociated in international law, specifically when 
referring to wars, whether internal or external.76 The perception of borders, as 
passive lines on a map, reveals integral forces in the economic, social, 
political, and environmental processes. Borders undoubtedly remain hot topics 
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across the social sciences and in the global headlines as underscoring the 
impact they have on a range of issues, such as economic development, inter- 
and intra-state conflict, global terrorism, migration, nationalism, international 
law, environmental sustainability, and natural resource management. The 
customary rule of the use, ownership and control of the territory has 
historically been the motive of wars or interventions. Territoriality also serves 
to the constructivist means of national identity by defying who “we” are and 
who “they” are. Determining who the actors are is crucial to conflict 
resolution. 
On the other hand, Post-Westphalians argue that failed states are “failed” 
because international assistance did not help with operations of state-building 
or nation-building as a responsibility and duty to protect. Ungoverned spaces 
open alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty.77 
According to Francis Deng, a vulnerable or failing state should invite 
international assistance precisely as a way to protect its state sovereignty and 
show its will towards good governance.78 Failed democracy in failed states 
opens controversial debates regarding fairness, selectiveness, and preventive 
collective intervention. 
According to non-interventionists any interference in the affairs of the 
sovereign state in the name of humanitarianism directly breaches the UN 
Charter restrictionist article 2(7): “nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”79 As questioned by Franck: who 
killed this article?80 In fact, realists argue that this could lead to abuse, because 
since interveners only pursue their national interests, they may use issues 
regarding human rights as a pretext for intervention in order to achieve their 
political objectives. Ian Brownlie, a leading restrictionist argues that 
humanitarian intervention, on the basis of all available definitions, would be an 
instrument wide open to abuse, “a rule allowing humanitarian intervention … 
is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial 
intervention.”81 There is no doubt that the problem of abuse could damage the 
already fragile issue of legality and legitimacy, however, this does not mean 
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that force should not be used when governments massacre their own citizens. 
“Sovereignty cannot be used as a pretext of governments as a license to kill.”82 
Besides legality, humanitarian crisis responses are driven by international 
politics of selectivity. What is of interest concerns the extent and the nature of 
selective interventionism. The problem of selectivity with respect to 
humanitarian standards and human rights principles arises from the fact that 
these rights, as embodied in various documents including the United Nations 
(UN) Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide 
Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the two International Covenants on 
Human Rights, are universally valid and, in some respects, even compelling 
(the principle of jus cogens) are often not applied in a consistent or ethical 
way. Consequently, double standards still predominate when the international 
community faces the dilemma whether or not to intervene. The arrangements 
of selectivity are not only empirically puzzling, but they also imply conflicting 
theoretical expectations with regard to the international response to 
humanitarian crises and the extent of the so-called “selectivity gap.” In 
essence, constructivist and cosmopolitan accounts emphasize the strengthening 
of “humanitarian” norms and identities. Therefore, there is a growing 
frequency of humanitarian action even in situations where no economic or 
geostrategic interests are in jeopardy. With the increasing significance of 
human rights norms on the international agenda, this would lead one to expect 
an increase in humanitarian activity as well as a high degree of consistency in 
addressing those crises. Contrariwise, “since many humanitarian crises do not 
affect vital interests, realist accounts would expect highly selective responses 
in such situations.”83 
The UN also faces predicaments regarding legitimacy, effectiveness, 
transparency, and corruption, as well as partiality and non-neutrality. The 
effectiveness of peacekeeping on democratization remains open to debate. A 
neutral UN peacekeeping mission can assist in the transition to democracy. 
Yet, a powerful external enforcer can end up being a substitute and part of the 
conflict for that embryonic democracy in fragile states. 
Second, international involvement may be necessary to end violence and to 
facilitate negotiations. But, democratization as well as peace-building needs to 
be driven by local motives and actions. The issue of ownership of local versus 
international control of the processes of democratization and peace-building is 
related to the systemic dilemma. The citizens of the countries that receive 
support for democratization and peace-building must feel that they own the 
processes, and that democracy is not imposed from the outside. The United 
Nations has to assume a more authoritative role or even transitional 
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administration in cases where either the local authorities fail to prevent crimes 
against humanity and mass violence (e.g., Sierra Leone, Timor Leste), or when 
the state itself was the perpetrator of atrocities (e.g., in Cambodia and Kosovo). 
Therefore, a difficult challenge must be faced by the international actors: to 
perform firm control to manage conflict, provide security, and organize 
elections, or to engage with “good offices” in order to empower local actors for 
them to conduct the necessary procedures towards a functioning state? For 
Simon Chesterman, the United Nations, faces the problem of building 
democracy in war-torn societies in ways that are fundamentally undemocratic 
to start with – the undermining of the state sovereignty over the responsibility 
to protect.84 
Third, the United Nations is often under financial pressure to manage a 
transition quickly in order to move resources on to the next crisis, as from 
Liberia to Sudan.85 The new multidimensional missions have included the 
democratic reconstruction model of peace-building and place a robust 
emphasis on the use of elections in post-conflict operations. By analyzing the 
commitment of parties to elections, their timing and their mechanics, UN peace 
operations present elections as a possible democratizing tool. That means a 
way of legitimizing international intervention, the formation of new 
governments as well as that of war termination. When the United Nations 
peace operations are involved in elections, are they building peace and 
democracy or organizing an exit?86 As previously elucidated, premature 
elections have become common for several reasons: the need to ‘‘do 
something’’ quickly, to start the process of political development and, of 
course, to have an identifiable ‘‘exit strategy’’ for international involvement. 
Peacekeeping missions do not last forever. Financial pressures force many 
missions to downsize as soon as it is minimally feasible to do so. But, 
according to Shaw, elections are no longer used as an exit strategy and the shift 
has facilitated the implementation of the democratic reconstruction model. 
However, even in the most conducive post-conflict situations, it remains 
extremely difficult to successfully facilitate democratic transitions in war-torn 
territories. As in the cases of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 
elections have shifted from being the central component of UN mission to 
being used as one aspect of a wider democratizing project. Cases such as these 
lend some weight to the World Bank’s suggestion that elections in war-torn 
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societies should be deferred by up to a decade to allow state building to 
occur.87 
Action can do harm. But inaction can also do worse. If the international 
community does something, either as humanitarian intervention to protect 
sovereignty or to protect the individual, the a priori conclusion is frequently: 
“It is too late!” Although, when it comes to saving lives, it is never too late for 
humanitarians. There is always a window of opportunity. Thus, a temporal 
dilemma is central to UN intervention queries. 
As consistently stated by Virginia Page Fortna: “Peacekeeping missions 
are habitually under-funded, under-equipped, and understaffed… peacekeeping 
can help establish peace, which is good for democracy, but it also undermines 
the establishment of that democracy.”88 Very often, they are decided at the last 
minute, with unrealistically short mandates and excessively ambitious 
timelines and benchmarks. The task of turning countries into stable, 
functioning, democratic states where political institutions, economic 
infrastructure, and the very fabric of society have all been devastated by civil 
war, is hectic and undermines sovereignty. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As introduced, at the end of a civil war, there is indeed no democracy just 
yet. There is a mist of hope and disillusionment about how democracy can 
bring peace and stability. There are not yet any pillars of an ideal western form 
of democracy as Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy suggests, with political 
and civil liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the 
freedom to form groups, citizen participation, and the responsiveness of 
government. Democracy requires peace and stability, but war and its pressures 
on the state can provide incentives for democratization. 
Civil wars are one of the critical issues of our time: they represent 
contemporary challenges not only to state stability and legitimacy, but also to 
regional and global order. From war to peace, how can democracy prevail over 
anarchy? Without naivety, post-civil war democracy is essentially procedural 
and minimalist. In this paper, I argue that on a status quo of belligerence, 
lawlessness, and distrust, the goal is to create political order first, and 
democratic liberties later. It is Hobbesian in its origin due to the nature of 
anarchy. At least in the period immediately following negotiations, the most 
probable version of democracy in post-war is the one the elites believe best 
minimizes threats to their existence, which includes the threat of the restoration 
of armed engagement. In the transition from war-to-peace, democracy might 
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prevail on a minimalist or Schumpeterian plane: it would be able to fit nascent 
democratic institutions to the specific conditions of a traumatized society on a 
collapsed state to contain such political-ethical-ideological tension within 
peaceful bounds. In the aftermath of civil war, democracy emphasizes 
leadership, and the elections, rather than appointment, of former warlords as 
political office holders. It simultaneously arbitrates conflicts between former 
warring factions and protects citizens’ properties against illegal expropriation 
and violence. Post-civil war democracy is also Popperian in its form because it 
is aimed at avoiding the return to civil war and anarchy by preventing 
tyrannical rule through elections. A political system is not democratic because 
the majority rules, but because the institutions are designed to prevent the rise 
of a totalitarian government that can a priori be dismissed through popular 
accountability instead of violent revolution. Even if democracy does not 
appropriately aggregate citizens’ preferences or adequately control politicians 
or help reduce economic inequalities, the very fact that it might help change 
governments without bloodshed can help generate a peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. This form of democracy is defensible because, better a minimalist 
form of democracy than maintenance of the belligerent and lawlessness status 
quo. 
The end of war is the start of a long process of multi-phased procedures 
towards democracy and peace. In order to make the transition to democracy, 
post-war conflict represents a struggle of dilemmas and trade-offs. This paper 
shines the spotlight on central dilemmas originated from the efforts of building 
peace and democracy in fragile states after war. In line with the finding of 
Jarstad and Sisk, and other authors and contributors, the horizontal, vertical, 
systemic, and temporal dilemma were analyzed.89 In this paper, I contribute 
theoretically to the body of knowledge by advancing the paradoxes faced by 
democratization and peace-building with additional 8 dilemmas: security, 
safety, moral, sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. In the 
second and third part, elections and constitutionalism were analyzed according 
to this set of dilemmas as sine qua non principles of democracy and the rule of 
law. A more realistic and less ideological appraisal of elections is still required. 
Success is dependent on a careful consideration of timing, sequencing, design, 
and resource issues. As part of a post-war peace deal, elections cannot be 
postponed for more than a few years. However, instant elections can be a 
dangerous toll to legitimize extremist parties without a proper development of 
a political party system. Independent electoral commissions are preferable as 
well as the sequence’s bottom-up approach, from local to national elections. 
Finally, as a responsibility to protect, democratization and peace-building are 
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promoted by international actors who also face impasses, like sovereignty, 
ownership, and empowerment, as well as transparency. 
The existing literature fails, as it tends to analyze democracy and peace 
principles as if they were the same in a post-civil war environment. The 
difficulties of post-civil war conditions should not be underestimated. New 
democratic regimes usually lack the resources or institutional means to make 
and guarantee the kind of accommodations that typify the consolidated 
democracies. There is no readily available formula, but the purpose is to avoid 
or mitigate some of the dilemmas that may arise on the transition from war to 
peace. Which model of democracy should be adopted, must be established on a 
case-by-case basis. Delegative, representative, or participatory democracies are 
ideal options, but not yet possible in these post-war societies. Due to size 
restrictions for this paper’s publication, and for a robust understanding, it is 
recommended that further analysis of the same set of dilemmas regarding 
justice, human rights, civil society, and the process of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of warring groups be conducted. In this 
paper, I argue that in war-torn societies’ transition, the model of democracy 
that might prevail in the aftermath of conflict is a minimalist form if political 
will, some infrastructural level, and an appropriate political climate are in 
place. Social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure, counter-
corruption measures, and impartial judiciary will come as a consequence after 
the reduction of ethnic divisions and an organized civil society has emerged. 
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